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Note
S.A.S. v. France: A Margin of Appreciation Gone Too
Far
NATHANIEL FLEMING
When is it permissible for a government to infringe on the religious rights of its
citizenry? When is such infringement necessary for a democracy? This is the central
concept underlying the margin of appreciation—a standard utilized by the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) to determine whether certain human
rights violations may be excused as “necessary in a democratic society.” While such
an approach certainly has its benefits—particularly considering that the ECHR is
an international body seeking to intervene in national politics—it also leaves
unresolved the question of the outer limits of such a standard. How far may a nation
violate religious rights, and who should determine those limits?
In S.A.S. v. France, the ECHR confronted this very issue and concluded that
the French prohibition on the public wearing of full-face veils—popularly described
as a “Burqa Ban”—was necessary in a democratic society. The basis for the
decision relied upon France’s argument that Muslim women who wear the veil are
incapable of socializing with their fellow citizens, which thereby inhibits their ability
to fully engage with civic society. In accepting France’s justification, the ECHR had
to overlook the wealth of evidence to the contrary in favor of accepting an
unsubstantiated and stereotypical belief that veil-wearing Muslim women are not
functioning members of a democratic society. At its core, the decision in S.A.S.
permitted France to firmly establish majoritarian cultural norms, rooted heavily in
Christianity, to the detriment of its Muslim minority population. This was a margin
of appreciation gone too far.
This Note aims to highlight numerous critiques of the ECHR’s decision in
S.A.S. and examine its aftermath in European politics. As will be seen, the standard
set forth by S.A.S. is counter to the very principles upon which the ECHR was
established. The court has permitted France to selectively favor the rights of some
citizens, rather than the rights of all its citizens. Worse still, S.A.S. has encouraged
other European nations to follow in France’s stead, and there is a growing trend in
favor of abrogating the religious rights of the Muslim population. If this trend is to
stop, the margin of appreciation must change.
917
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S.A.S. v. France: A Margin of Appreciation Gone Too
Far
NATHANIEL FLEMING *
INTRODUCTION
When the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (Convention) was created, the drafters sought to
establish different standards of review depending on the right that was at
issue. While infringing on the rights against torture was absolutely
unreasonable, the signatory states were granted more deference in the rights
of expression and religion. For the latter rights, the Convention recognized
that a state may permissibly infringe upon those rights, so long as the
infringement was “necessary in a democratic society.”1 The European Court
of Human Rights (ECHR) later dubbed this concept as the “margin of
appreciation.”2 While this doctrine has enabled state suppression of certain
fundamental rights, logically there must be some limit to the margin of
appreciation in order to uphold the Convention and actually protect these
rights. However, the 2014 decision in S.A.S. v. France suggests otherwise.
The margin of appreciation applied by the ECHR in S.A.S. authorized France
to restrict the religious liberties of Muslim women and ban the veil3 in order
to protect the supposed rights of other French citizens to socialize with these
women.4 This Note considers the aftermath of this decision and challenges
whether the ECHR is truly capable of preserving religious freedoms as the
margin of appreciation now stands.
Part I discusses the factual history of S.A.S., including the political
interests that instituted the ban on the veil, and the holding of the ECHR.
This section also examines the aftermath of S.A.S. and the spread of similar
bans throughout the continent in the four years since the decision. Part II
considers three prominent critiques of S.A.S.: that French secularism
represented in S.A.S. violates religious freedom; that the holding in S.A.S.
*

University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D., 2019; Vassar College, B.A. in Political Science
and History. I would like to thank Professor Mark Janis for inspiring me to write on this topic, providing
wonderful guidance, and assisting me in reviewing an earlier draft of this Note. Special thanks to my
colleagues at the Connecticut Law Review for their thoughtful and meticulous editing of this Note.
1
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 9, Nov. 4, 1950.
2
E.g., Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment of 7 Dec. 1976,
¶ 57.
3
Veil, as used throughout both S.A.S. and this Note, is shorthand for both the burqa, which covers
the entire face, and the niqab, which covers all but the eyes.
4
S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014), ¶ 155 [hereinafter S.A.S.].
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authorizes forced assimilation of cultural minorities; and that S.A.S.
emboldens counter-factualism in European politics. Part III examines these
critiques to determine the common cause of these issues. Lastly, this Note
concludes that the ECHR’s application of the margin of appreciation is
unsustainable in order to preserve democracy and protect religious liberty.
I. THE HISTORY OF S.A.S. V. FRANCE
A. The Politics Behind a “Burqa Ban”
The conflict displayed in S.A.S. arose five years before the ECHR
ultimately decided the issue. In 2009, the Presidents of the National
Assembly––the lower house of the French parliament––began developing
legislation to restrict the usage of full-face veils.5 Although France does not
maintain census data of racial or ethnic categories,6 the National Assembly
reported that only 1900 women wore the veil—90% of whom were under
age forty, two-thirds were French nationals, and one-in-four were recent
converts to Islam.7 The report further claimed that the use of the veil was
untethered to actual religious expression and, instead, stemmed from
extremist fundamentalist traditions.8 Seizing on this notion of extremism,
the report concluded that the veil is incompatible with values of the French
Republic: liberty, equality, and fraternity.9 Ostensibly, the veil denied liberty
because it was a form of subservience, negated gender equality, and, most
importantly, outright negated contact with others and violated the French
ideal of “living together.”10 Consequently, the report concluded that it was
necessary to “release women from the subservience of the full-face veil” and
create a ban on wearing the veil.11
Relying on this report, the National Assembly first unanimously adopted
a resolution opposing the use of the veil in 2010.12 While restating many of
the core conceits of the report, the resolution prioritized ending gender
discrimination and protecting women who were forced to wear the veil.13
Soon thereafter, both houses of the French parliament passed a
comprehensive ban on the veil with only one vote in opposition.14 The law
boldly proclaimed that “[n]o one may, in public places, wear clothing that is
5

Id. ¶ 15.
Alexander Stile, Can the French Talk About Race?, NEW YORKER (July 11, 2014),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/can-the-french-talk-about-race.
7
S.A.S., supra note 4, ¶ 16.
8
Id.
9
Id. ¶ 17.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id. ¶ 24.
13
Id.
14
Id. ¶ 27.
6
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designed to conceal the face.”15 If someone violated this law—in other
words, if any woman were caught wearing a veil—she would be subject to
a citizenship course and a fine.16 Although a partial ban on the veil was
considered, the legislative history reflects a belief that any less restrictive
measure would not adequately satisfy the legislative priorities for banning
the veil.17 Moreover, the law included numerous exceptions for health,
occupation, sports, and festivities and artistic or traditional events.18 For
instance, this ban would not apply to head coverings during a religious
procession.19 The French constitutional court later added an exemption for
wearing full-face coverings in places of worship.20 Lastly, the new law
included a new provision to the Criminal Code that would punish anyone
who “forces one or more other persons to conceal their face, by threat,
duress, coercion, abuse of authority or of office, on account of their
gender.”21 This punishment included a year of imprisonment and a
substantial fine of 30,000 euros.22
When the French ban went into effect in 2011, few other European
nations had comparable bans. Mere months after France’s ban was passed,
Belgium passed a comparable law that likewise banned full or substantial
face coverings in public.23 The ECHR describes the Belgian law as a
comparably broad blanket ban on any face coverings while in public.24 The
legislative history showed the law was even similarly premised on the notion
that women who wear the veil are incapable of “living together” with other
members of their society.25 The Belgian Constitutional Court ultimately
upheld this law.26 In addition, two other European nations attempted similar
laws. While the Dutch parliament proposed four separate bans on wearing
full-face veils in public, the Dutch constitutional court ultimately struck
down each proposal.27 Similarly, in Spain, a number of municipalities
attempted citywide bans on full-face veils that were eventually defeated at
the Spanish Supreme Court.28 In both Spain and the Netherlands, the
15
Id. ¶ 28 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Act No 2010-1192 of 11 October 2010
Prohibiting the Concealing of the Face in Public, ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION
IN EUROPE, https://www.legislationline.org/documents/id/20201 (unofficial translation of the French
law, which prohibits concealing the face in public and describes consequences).
16
S.A.S., supra note 4, ¶ 28.
17
Id. ¶ 25.
18
Id. ¶ 28.
19
Id. ¶ 31.
20
Id. ¶ 30.
21
Id. ¶ 29.
22
Id.
23
Id. ¶¶ 40–41.
24
Id. ¶ 41.
25
Id. ¶ 42 (internal quotation marks omitted).
26
Id.
27
Id. ¶ 49.
28
Id. ¶ 43.
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constitutional courts rejected the same justifications articulated by France in
support of its ban.29 Both courts found no support for the belief that the veil
is incompatible with the social order.30 Moreover, the Spanish court added
that this ban would have the counterproductive effect of driving veil-wearing
women into hiding and intensifying the discrimination against them.31
In international law, many organizations also disagreed with the French
approach. While the Council of Europe agreed that ending the subjugation
of women forced to wear the veil was a sensible goal, it contended that a
general prohibition would have negative repercussions.32 Rather than
liberating women, the Council of Europe noted that a general ban would
likely force women who choose to wear a veil to confine themselves at
home.33 The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe
concurred, while also noting the dearth of evidence in support of France’s
contention that the veil undermines democracy.34 The Commissioner even
linked the perceptions of the veil to Islamophobia and concluded that these
bans undermine multiculturalism, an essential European value.35
Nonetheless, despite opposition to the ban from members of the international
community, the French parliament created a new paradigm for the
relationship between European Muslims and their nation. With this ban,
France laid the groundwork for an inevitable challenge to the ECHR.
B. The Inevitable Litigation
Although decided in 2014, the S.A.S. litigation began the day that
France’s ban went into effect in 2011.36 S.A.S., then a twenty-four-year-old
French national, was a devout Muslim who personally elected to wear the
burqa or niqab at various times.37 S.A.S. followed “the Sunni cultural
tradition” and ascribed to the belief that “it is customary and respectful for
women to wear a full-face veil in public.”38 In particular, S.A.S. wished to
be able to wear her veil in public to express her own faith during religious
events, including the month-long observation of Ramadan.39 Alongside her
application, S.A.S. submitted a statement describing the effects of the ban
that she experienced personally. She wrote:

29

Id. ¶¶ 47, 51.
Id.
31
Id. ¶ 47.
32
Id. ¶ 35.
33
Id.
34
Id. ¶ 37.
35
Id.
36
Id. ¶ 1; Steven Erlanger, France Enforces Ban on Full-Face Veils in Public, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
11, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/world/europe/12france.html.
37
S.A.S., supra note 4, ¶¶ 10, 11.
38
Id. ¶ 76.
39
Id. ¶ 12.
30
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I am now vilified and attacked on the streets of the Republic I
love, effectively reduced to house arrest, virtually ostracized
from public life and marginalized. . . . [C]riminalisation, or
rather the political scaremongering that preceded it, has incited
members of the public to now openly abuse and attack me
whenever I drive wearing my veil. Pedestrians and other
drivers routinely now spit on my car and shout sexual
obscenities and religious bigotry. Consequently, I now feel
like a prisoner in my own Republic, as I no longer feel able to
leave my house unless it is essential. I leave the house less
frequently as a result. I wear my veil with even less frequency
when out in public as a result. Indeed, I also feel immense guilt
that I am forced to no longer remain faithful to my core
religious values.40
This fear of harassment motivated S.A.S. to remain anonymous41 when
she sued France alleging that France violated her rights to freedom of
religion and expression protected by articles 8 and 9 of the European
Convention on Human Rights.42
In her arguments, S.A.S. contended that France’s assumptions of the veil
were entirely baseless and rooted in stereotype.43 Contrary to the beliefs
articulated by the French parliament, S.A.S. asserted that “the veil often
denoted women’s emancipation, self-assertion and participation in
society.”44 To S.A.S., wearing the veil was not about appeasing men, but
rather was done to satisfy herself and her own conscience.45 Rather than
recognize these different perspectives, France adopted a paternalistic
approach declaring the implicit values of the religious expression of a
minority culture.46 Moreover, the purpose of the ban was compromised by
its actualization: the law was supposed to protect women from subjugation,
yet it created a punishment for the same women it sought to protect.47 Lastly,
the exceptions provided by the law unfairly favored Christians.48 The
exceptions, premised in the context of a Christian majority, were written
such that they allowed face coverings during common Christian festivities
while prohibiting Muslim women from wearing the veil during the month of
Ramadan.49 Altogether, S.A.S.’s arguments painted the portrait of a nation
40

Eva Brems, S.A.S. v. France: A Reality Check, 25 NOTTINGHAM L.J. 58, 60–61 (2016).
Id. at 61.
42
S.A.S., supra note 4, ¶ 74.
43
Id. ¶ 77.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. ¶ 78.
47
Id.
48
Id. ¶ 80.
49
Id.
41
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so devoted to the values of a Christian majority that it would rather compel
assimilation than accept a diversity of cultural beliefs.
Expectedly, France countered S.A.S.’s arguments with a number of
reasons to claim that its actions fell within the margin of appreciation
accorded by articles 8 and 9.50 Drawing on the legislative history, France
raised claims that it was merely seeking gender equality or protecting public
safety.51 The ECHR quickly dispatched these claims.52 However, France’s
argument that the veil impaired the ideal of “living together” held greater
sway with the court.53 Here, France contended that, as a result of concealing
one’s face, a person was effectively breaking social ties and refusing to live
together with other members of French society.54 Thus, it was necessary for
France to prohibit full-face coverings when these garments undermined this
core notion of French civic engagement.55
Ultimately, the ECHR accepted France’s notion of “living together” and
found no violation of articles 8 or 9.56 While incorporating France’s
argument, the court reasoned that in order to protect this need to live
together––recontextualized as “respect for the minimum requirements of life
in a society”––France was effectively protecting the rights of others.57 Put
differently, France was protecting the rights of its non-veil wearing citizens
to socialize with women that would otherwise be wearing a veil. Solely
under these grounds, the court found that the law was justified to preserve
“the right of others to live in a space of socialisation which makes living
together easier.”58 Thus, in accepting the legitimacy of France’s “living
together” argument, the court swiftly dismissed concerns over the breadth
and impact of this ban since it was necessary to uphold a cornerstone of
French society.59 Indeed, as the court succinctly concluded, “France had a
wide margin of appreciation in the present case,”60 and could abrogate the
religious freedom of S.A.S. in pursuit of its goal.
While the fifteen-judge majority swiftly glossed over S.A.S.’s
arguments, the dissenting opinion accorded far greater weight to S.A.S.’s
concerns. When the majority sided with France, it bizarrely claimed that the
central purpose of the ban was not “to protect women against a practice
50

Id. ¶¶ 81, 84.
Id. ¶ 82.
52
Id. ¶¶ 115–18.
53
See id. ¶ 82 (expanding on the theory that the veil could break social ties and result in a refusal
to conform with the rest of society).
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. ¶¶ 157–59.
57
Id. ¶¶ 121–22.
58
Id. ¶¶ 122, 142.
59
Id. ¶¶ 151–52.
60
Id. ¶ 155.
51
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which was imposed on them.”61 As the dissent demonstrated, this argument
completely ignores the fact that the legislative history repeatedly referred to
the veil as a “form of subservience” and sought to liberate women from this
subjugation.62 Moreover, with little justification, the majority ignored
S.A.S.’s own positive perception of the veil. Instead, the majority accepted
and legitimized the supposed, and unsubstantiated, harmful ideology of the
veil ascribed by France.63 Yet, “even assuming that such interpretations of
the full-face veil are correct, it has to be stressed that there is no right not to
be shocked or provoked by different models of cultural or religious identity,
even those that are very different from the traditional French and European
lifestyle.”64 It is patently contrary to European notions of religious and
personal freedom to restrict someone’s attire merely because it demonstrates
a radical opinion.65
The dissent also found issue with France’s “living together” argument.
Without justification, France presumed that it was impossible to
communicate with someone wearing a veil.66 At the same time, there is a
well-recognized right to privacy, which could even be construed as a “right
to be an outsider.”67 To support France’s argument, the court would
effectively recognize a right of someone to contact any other person in a
public space regardless of the other person’s will.68 Not only is this right
illogical, but the underlying assumption is equally irrational: there is no
evidence that one cannot communicate with someone whose face is
obscured.69 It would be ridiculous to claim that someone wearing a helmet,
costume, or ski mask cannot speak to another person.70 Instead, the dissent
singled out the true justification for the ban and the majority’s decision:
“selective pluralism and restricted tolerance” to different cultures.71 When
faced with a culture expressing radically different norms, it was simpler to
ban the nonconformity to European norms rather than attempt to understand
this culture or even S.A.S.’s position on the veil. Thus, the broad margin of
appreciation granted to France by the court enabled it to trammel the rights
of a religious minority, likely resulting in further exclusion and increased
oppression.72
61

Id. ¶ 137.
Id. ¶ 6 (Nussberger, J., and Jäderblom, J., dissenting).
63
Id.
64
Id. ¶ 7.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. ¶ 8.
68
Id.
69
Id. ¶ 9.
70
Id.
71
Id. ¶ 14.
72
See id. ¶ 21 (arguing that the ban will serve to worsen the exclusion of Muslim women from
society).
62
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C. The Aftermath of S.A.S.
In the time since S.A.S. was decided, the ECHR has decided two similar
cases––Belcacemi & Oussar v. Belgium and Dakir v. Belgium––addressing
the Belgian ban referenced in S.A.S.73 Both of these cases effectively retread
the same arguments presented in S.A.S.: an applicant suing for violation of
articles 8 and 9 while Belgium claims a legitimate aim in preserving the
rights of its citizens to “liv[e] together.”74 Applying the same wide margin
of appreciation utilized in S.A.S., the court likewise concluded that
Belgium’s ban was a permissible intrusion on the freedom of religion.75
However, these cases also further expanded the margin of appreciation
granted to the right of living together. In S.A.S., the court recognized that “in
view of the flexibility of the notion of ‘living together’ and the resulting risk
of abuse, the Court must engage in a careful examination of the necessity of
the impugned limitation.”76 Alternatively, in the Belgian cases, the court has
seemingly discarded this careful examination; instead, the court was
satisfied by the bare showing that the Belgian ban was democratically
created. 77 Moreover, while S.A.S. addressed the potential harmful social
effects on Muslim women,78 there was no comparable discussion in either
Dakir or Belcacemi. In total, this suggests an even greater shift in power in
favor of the states than was first granted in S.A.S. As of now, it seems that a
state may pass any restriction on religion so long as it is justified by the need
to “live together,” regardless of the social stigma created by the ban.
Indeed, in the years following S.A.S., a number of similar bans have been
adopted throughout Europe. In May of 2018, Denmark passed a nation-wide
ban on the veil.79 Similar to the French ban, the Danish law likewise used
neutral language prohibiting any “garment that hides the face.”80 Likewise,
Austria passed a general prohibition on the veil in October 2017 that
mirrored the language used in France’s law.81 In Switzerland, although its
73
Dakir v. Belgium, App. No. 4619/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017), ¶¶ 1, 3 [hereinafter Dakir],
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22appno%22:[%224619/12%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001175660%22]}; Belcacemi & Oussar v. Belgium, App. No. 37798/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2017), ¶¶ 1, 3
[hereinafter Belcacemi], https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-175141%22]}.
74
Dakir, supra note 73, ¶¶ 3, 21; Belcacemi, supra note 73, ¶¶ 3, 18.
75
Dakir, supra note 73, ¶ 54; Belcacemi, supra note 73, ¶ 51.
76
S.A.S., supra note 4, ¶ 122.
77
Dakir, supra note 73, ¶¶ 57–58.
78
E.g., S.A.S., supra note 4, ¶ 151 (acknowledging that the ban primarily affects Muslim women
wishing to wear the full-face veil).
79
Martin Selsoe Sorensen & Megan Specia, Denmark’s Ban on Muslim Face Veil Is Met with
Protest, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/01/world/europe/denmark-banmuslim-veil.html.
80
Id.
81
Christine Hauser & Liam Stack, Dutch Lawmakers Approve Partial Ban on Burqas and Niqabs,
N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/world/europe/netherlands-facecovering-ban.html?module=inline. A few nations have also passed minor bans that warrant less
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federal government opposed such a move, two of its cantons have adopted
public bans on the veil.82 Most recently, the Dutch parliament––despite
earlier pronouncements by its Council of State83—passed a new ban that
prohibits face coverings in schools, government offices, and hospitals
without limiting their use in public.84 The creator of this law celebrated this
achievement on Twitter using the hashtags “stopislam” and “deislamize.”85
II. INTERPRETING S.A.S.
There are multiple modes of interpreting S.A.S. and far too many to fully
discuss here. Yet, three prominent interpretations reveal a consistent
problem with S.A.S. First, S.A.S. is often derided for representing the ills of
secularist policy as it violates religious freedoms. Moreover, this policy even
spills into supporting assimilation of religious minorities into the majority—
in France, Christianity. Lastly, proponents of S.A.S. and bans on the veil
ignore these realities and push forward a counter-factualist agenda. These
problems stem from a common cause: an excessively broad margin of
appreciation that enables France to neglect religious freedoms without any
oversight.
A. Secularism
An ever-present concern in S.A.S. was France’s desire to remain a
secular nation and whether, in so doing, France abrogated the religious rights
of its citizens. France’s secularist approach to religion is codified within its
own Constitution of 1958: “France shall be an indivisible, secular,
democratic and social Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens
before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect
all beliefs.”86 Generally, the implementation of French secularism is
ostensibly founded on the notion that the state acts neutrally towards all
religious matters.87 While public events are secular, religious denominations
are supposed to enjoy legal equality, and non-discrimination laws prevent
discussion. A ban on face coverings while driving, as well as for anyone working in civil service, the
military, or for an election, recently went into effect in Germany. Id. Bulgaria also now bans the veil in
government offices, schools, and cultural institutions. Id.
82
Michael Shields, Swiss Canton Becomes Second to Ban Burqas in Public, REUTERS (Sept. 23,
2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-swiss-burqas/swiss-canton-becomes-second-to-ban-burqasin-public-idUSKCN1M30J2.
83
S.A.S., supra note 4, ¶ 52.
84
Hauser & Stack, supra note 81.
85
Id.; Geert Wilders (@geertwilderspvv), TWITTER (June 27, 2018, 1:46 AM),
https://twitter.com/geertwilderspvv/status/1011893627184930816?lang=en.
86
1958 CONST. pmbl. art. 1 (Fr.).
87
Lasia Bloss, European Law of Religion: Organizational and Institutional Analysis of National
Systems and Their Implications for the Future European Integration Process 21 (N.Y. Univ. Law Sch.
Jean Monnet Program, Working Paper No. 13/03, 2003).
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differential treatment to individuals based on their beliefs.88 As a result,
France does not maintain official statistics of religious demographics.89
Nonetheless, third party surveyors estimate that 80% of France’s population
is Roman Catholic.90 Muslims constitute the second largest religious group
with three million followers (approximately 4.5% of the population).91
Meanwhile, 6% of the population is unaffiliated and 1% is Jewish.92 As one
might anticipate from these demographics though, France’s implementation
of its secularism has often skewed in favor of the majority beliefs to the
detriment of the minority.
Despite France’s claim to be a secular state, scholars have noted that
France’s historic roots have bound it to Judeo-Christian traditions resulting
in selective application of this secularist policy.93 Because of a historical
connection to the Catholic Church, local governments in the Alsace and
Moselle regions along with French Guyana maintain formal connections
with the Catholic Church.94 In these areas, Christian and Jewish
denominations are treated as public institutions and receive state subsidies
and public funding.95 This explicit religious connection in Alsace and
Moselle, in particular, is due to the unique history of the region. Under
Napoleon’s Concordat with the Pope in 1801, Catholicism was established
as the national religion of France.96 This decree was eventually overturned
in 1905 when France enacted a strict separation of church and state, which
has since formed the backbone of its secularism policy.97 However, in 1905,
Alsace and Moselle were part of Germany and the new law did not apply to
them.98 Although these regions have since become a part of France once
again, they have retained their political ties to the Catholic Church; as recent
as 2013, the French Constitutional Council reaffirmed the validity of this
policy when rejecting a claim that it violated French secularism.99 In French
tax policy, a number of Christian and Jewish denominations also enjoy
tax-exempt status, while other faiths, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, are
subjected to a 60% tax on all funds they receive.100
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More recently, in the early 2000s, there was a documented shift in the
language describing this principle of secularism from a focus in organizing
public life to defending national values from a foreign threat.101 Two French
government reports submitted in 2003 declared that “political Islam” was
the primary threat to the Republic.102 Following these reports, right-wing
French politicians became fixated on secularism and defending against this
supposed threat of Islam.103 A few months later, another report was
published that posited secularism as essential to maintaining social and
political integration.104 Ultimately, drawing on the conclusions of these
reports, then-French President Jacques Chirac established the “Commission
Reflecting on the Application of the Principle of Secularism in the
Republic.”105 One signature policy achievement from this commission was
the institution of a ban on religious garb in public schools, which resulted in
singling out hijab-wearing Muslim students.106
Consequently, as evident in S.A.S., France’s secularist policy has a
tendency to single out Islam and prevent Muslim forms of religious
expression. While there is general acceptance for displaying crosses and
kippas (or yarmulkes), the wearing of veils and hijabs has often been
targeted by bans on religious garb.107 While Christians and Jews have long
lived in France, it was not until the French Muslim population grew
substantially that these bans began to emerge.108 These policies even tend to
privilege atheists above all others, since they are not compelled by faith to
wear religious garb that might run afoul of the law.109 Although secularism
was not discussed outright in S.A.S., it still permeates France’s “living
together” argument.110 In essence, secularism is so fundamental in French
society that it is impossible to live together unless someone’s religious garb
is stripped from them.111 More still, French secularism has led to a
hyper-fixation on the perceived ideology of the veil. For years in France,
veil-wearing women have been cast as a source of menace and fear.112 Akin
to the way that tabloids treat celebrities, Muslim women have been subjected
101
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to intense public scrutiny such that everyone in France can immediately
recognize a veil even without ever meeting someone who wears one.113
Under intense public scrutiny, “[g]ossip circuits” form in which people
create their own meaning for the veil.114 Consequently, the French
perception of the veil is founded on a “meaning” of the veil deprived of any
direct experience with the veil.115 Framing the issue in this light, France is
enabled by its secularist policy to restrict the veil and completely disregard
the opinions of actual veil-wearers, including S.A.S.116
Furthermore, French secularist policy is rife with contradictions and
arbitrary decision making. In order to defend secularism, France is actually
forced to define and categorize religious practices, which only serves to
further enmesh French politics in religion.117 Clearly, unless France wishes
to completely destroy individual freedoms, it must determine what actions
have religious connotations, and therefore are prohibited, and which actions
are acceptable.118 Of course, this determination is still rooted in the
Judeo-Christian traditions of France in which Christian traditions have long
been incorporated into the actual functioning of the government.119 France–
–along with many other nations––employs double standards when
interacting with different religions. While France is clearly comfortable in
recognizing the multiple denominations of Christianity to the point of
excluding certain ones from tax exemptions,120 Islam is typically treated as
a monolithic religion with only one perspective.121 Ultimately, to some
observers, French secularism is merely pretext to justify institutionalized
favoritism of certain beliefs at a significant determinant to religious
minorities, particularly Muslims.122
French secularism has also influenced and, at times, impaired its
international relationships. Despite a longstanding commitment to human
rights, France has been noticeably reticent to adopt international protections
for these rights.123 France can claim ownership of the 1789 Declaration of
the Rights of Man and the Citizen that contributed to the groundwork of the
Convention as well as being a founding member of the Council of Europe;
yet, France did not ratify the Convention until 1974 and only accepted
113
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individual petitions beginning in 1981—twenty-eight years after the
Convention came into effect.124 This reluctance has been attributed to its
policy of secularism alongside the brutality inflicted by France during the
Algerian war.125 Moreover, France was likewise hesitant in ratifying other
international human rights agreements, including the International Bill of
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the
International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights.126 The ECHR’s
decision in S.A.S. was also not the first foray into international review of
France’s secularist policy. The ECHR has previously reviewed, and upheld,
similar bans on religious attire in schools in suits brought by Muslim
students.127 Similar to S.A.S., the ECHR has likewise allowed this policy of
secularism to persist under the margin of appreciation.128
B. Forced Assimilation
National policies, such as the veil ban at issue in S.A.S., also carry the
dangerous potential of inflicting a majority culture on every citizen to the
extent of eliminating any diversity. Indeed, one perversion of the secularism
policy discussed above is that it completely turns state norms of neutrality
on their head: rather than the state being responsible for religious neutrality,
it is instead incumbent on individual citizens to behave neutrally.129 In
essence, devout citizens, particularly those of minority religions, must
assimilate to whatever standard the nation declares to be neutral and secular.
Worse still, the very decision of S.A.S. appears to hold that “the ‘right of
others’; the majority, is to be imposed on the minority as a measure of social
cohesion and mandatory engagement even where the minority do not request
such engagement or deem it desirable.”130 France’s “living together”
argument is not just that it protects the right of socialization; the essence of
the argument is that states can impose these social obligations against the
will of the individual.131 Under this reasoning, a state is well within its
powers to further enshrine a majority culture while castigating any
124
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nonconformists.132 Following S.A.S., a state can just as easily prohibit any
other innocuous religious practice simply because the majority finds such
practice distasteful.133
The decision in S.A.S. thwarts the purposes of the Convention by
enabling these types of policies. When enacted, the Convention was
supposed to embody longstanding egalitarian principles and prevent cultural
subjugation and intolerance.134 The Convention was also a direct response
to the rise of Nazism and fascism in the first half of the twentieth century.135
From its inception, the Convention was thus conceived as a shield against
the injustices that a state might inflict upon its people.136 As a result of this
noble policy, the ECHR gained considerable respect and recognition from
both national and international actors.137 Yet, now, that supposed shield is
being used to batter a religious minority at the behest of a majority. Instead
of furthering the purpose of the Convention, the decision in S.A.S. could
easily further the practices that it was supposed to prevent. Fascism and
nationalism are once more on the rise in Europe.138 Across the continent,
parties such as the British National Party, English Defense League, Austria’s
Freedom Party, and Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland party have
garnered considerable strength and advocate similar party goals of the
European fascists of the early-twentieth century: under the guise of
populism, or helping the common person, these groups articulate a hatred of
foreigners and strong desire to impose a national, or majoritarian, culture on
the people.139 In this context, S.A.S. is particularly dangerous. Relying solely
on the democratic legitimacy of the state’s restriction of religion––as the
ECHR continues to do in S.A.S. and its progeny140––cannot be the only
consideration employed when determining permissible impairment of legal
rights.141 Nazism was a legal entity, supported by the political machinations
of Germany, and garnered majority support.142 Under S.A.S., fascism and
Nazism can become a valid policy so long as it is supported by “democratic
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legitimacy,” regardless of whether the policy violates essential human
rights.143
These outcomes are not simply hypothetical either; indeed, the
repercussions of a similar Chinese national policy enforcing socialization
are already observable and foretell the potential outcomes of France’s
“living together” agenda. In the far northwest of China lies the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region that is home to the Uyghurs, a Turkic ethnic
and majority Muslim population.144 In total, contemporary China has
fifty-six officially recognized ethnicities with the Han culture composing the
majority of the population in mainland China.145 Rather than recognize the
diversity of ethnicities across its nation, the Chinese government has
preferred to reimagine its population as a singular culture and a single
identity.146 A 2009 statement from the Ministry of Information reflects this
belief that: “From ancient times until today, many ethnic groups have lived
on the territory of Xinjiang. Every ethnic group who has ever laboured,
existed, and multiplied in Xinjiang has been a member of the Chinese nation
(zhonghua minzu).”147 This document further claimed that “[e]thnic unity is
the means by which the frontier can be civilised,” and “ethnic unity is
prosperity, ethnic separation is disaster.”148 Drawing on these contentions of
a single unified national identity, China has long-imposed a policy that is
comparable to the French “living together” notion: the minzu tuanjie
(nationality unity) and minzu pingdeng (nationality equality).149 These
policies envisage the “fading away of ethnicity” and the “fusion” of all the
ethnic groups as key to the success of the country.150
China’s policies have particularly impacted the Uyghur population.
Under what amounts to the same “living together” justification as argued by
France in S.A.S., China has spent decades stifling religious expression of the
Uyghurs in an effort to assimilate them into the majority culture.151 Similar
to the French veil ban, the Chinese policies expressly define what types of
religious expression are socially acceptable.152 For instance, the Chinese
government prevents Muslim parents from teaching their children their
religion, prevents adults and children from attending mosques, bans
pilgrimages to Mecca, and prevents male Muslim teachers from growing a
143
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beard.153 Worse still, Muslims are frequently prohibited from fasting during
Ramadan, which is a central tenet of the Muslim faith.154 These bans are
often premised on the notion of “preventing use of schools and government
offices to promote religion” or, in other words, maintaining secularism as a
national policy.155 Most similar to France’s ban on the veil, one report
described a similar censure of Muslim attire:
Around the corner from Kashgar’s 572-year-old Id Kah
Mosque, a large notice board implores Uyghurs to adopt
modern attire. One half of the board is covered in pictures
depicting traditional Uyghurs, women in colourful dresses and
flowing hair and clean-shaven men. The other half shows rows
of men with beards and women in headscarves or
face-covering veils, all with a red X over them.156
In total, the Chinese policies against the Uyghurs plainly seek to
eliminate any behavior that deviates from the norms of the majority culture
and its traditions.
However, rather than build a strong national community and foster
social cohesion as intended, China’s policies towards the Uyghurs have only
caused strife and political violence. Among Uyghurs there is a pervasive
feeling of a “cultural genocide.”157 Naturally, this has also fueled feelings of
powerlessness and a sense that Beijing will inevitably destroy every aspect
of their culture.158 Much of the resentment felt by the Uyghurs towards
Beijing has been expressed through non-violent means.159 However, some
have acted more extremely, choosing to assault Chinese security forces and
non-Uyghur settlers in the region with terrible acts of violence.160
Responding to this violence, the Chinese government has enacted further
repression of the Uyghurs in order to root out the “terrorist threat from
Muslim Uighurs.”161 In addition to the assimilationist policies, the Uyghurs
now also suffer extensive surveillance and censorship.162 As the conflict
153
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stands, Uyghur resentment of the state is at an all-time high and there is
growing support for an Uyghur separatist movement.163 Yet, at the same
time, China continues to restrict the rights of the Uyghurs and is unlikely to
alter this policy anytime soon.164
While the Uyghurs’ treatment by the Chinese government is certainly
an extreme example, it provides a magnification of the protracted
ramifications of the decision in S.A.S. The ethnic strife in China did not begin
overnight; rather, it is the product of decades of slow-building conflict that
is most visible now that the violence and oppression is openly visible to
outside observers. Comparatively, France is at a far earlier stage in its
treatment of veil-wearing Muslim women. So far there is but one ban that
only affects a (supposedly) small portion of the Muslim population. Yet, this
one law has already sowed seeds of considerable division and social unrest.
S.A.S. described that harassment and fear she experienced every time that
she wore her veil in public.165 S.A.S.’s experience was not an outlier. Scores
of other women likewise reported that they felt intimidated, silenced, and
forced into seclusion as a result of this law.166 Not only does this law codify
a legal division between veil-wearing Muslims and the rest of the populace,
it also fostered Islamophobic sentiments among the population as well. It is
hardly an outlandish conclusion to think that this policy might equally fuel
Muslim resentment of the French government. If more anti-Muslim policies
follow, it may be only a matter of time until the relationship between France
and its Muslim population mirrors the conflict between the Uyghurs and the
Chinese government.
C. Counter-Factualism
The decision in S.A.S. enables another common facet in fascist regimes:
a distaste for concrete evidence in favor of legislating based on cultural
biases. As mentioned in Part I, the French parliament enacted the veil ban
under the guidance of a report detailing the commonality of the veil and its
religious significance. To add further detail, this was a 658-page report that
consulted 200 witnesses and experts and even sent questionnaires to
numerous French embassies.167 However, the creators of this report never
intended to interview any veil-wearing women, and only interviewed a
single veil-wearer after she requested to be heard.168 In other words, France
passed a law to regulate the behavior of an entire religion when it had little
163
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information as to why these practices were observed. Moreover, both France
and the ECHR conveniently disregarded substantial empirical evidence that
undermined France’s policy. Prior to the ban, empirical research
demonstrated that veil-wearing women led “average” lives and routinely
engaged in common social activities, including “contact with others at
school (picking up children), in shops, [and in] administrative offices.”169
While other non-veil-wearers perceived a barrier to communication, there
was no evidence that these women were actively secluding themselves from
socialization.170 Instead, the evidence submitted to the ECHR by France
itself demonstrates that the ban impaired the social participation of these
women.171 Likewise, another report submitted to the court demonstrated that
“[t]he ban and public discourse seems to have implicitly legitimized the
abusive treatment of veiled women.”172 Ultimately, there was no evidentiary
support for the ban and, instead, both France and the ECHR opted to rely on
baseless assumptions of the meaning of the veil.
Had France or the ECHR considered the experiences of people who
actually wear the veil, they would have been exposed to perspectives that
are very different from those reflected in the legislative history of the ban.
Eva Brems, a professor of human rights law, conducted a number of
interviews with French women who wear the veil, which reveal a narrative
contrary to the presumptions employed by France.173 One woman recalled
that, prior to the ban:
At the time I lived in a neighborhood of old people . . . . And
these people recognized me without any problem and they
acted toward me as if they saw whoever else in the street . . . .
We were good neighbors, and I remember that when we
moved, the old people were even sad because they told us:
“Oh, we knew you so well and we knew that we could count
on you, that we could ask you something.”174
Some women even recalled that their social interactions helped to
remedy negative biases:
In a supermarket, people told me “madam, why do you wear
that?” I came closer to a gentleman and told him what the
religion says. It is not mandatory but if you do it on your own
initiative . . . . He told me “maybe your husband forced you.”
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I said “you see, I do my shopping all alone, and I drive alone,
there is nobody with me.” And he was satisfied.175
However, the experiences of these women changed drastically after the
ban was enacted. One woman with a two-and-a-half-year-old son is too
afraid to accompany him when he goes to play in the park.176 Another
described her harassment:
Last time I went to Auchan (supermarket EB), a mob formed
around me and people were saying “what are you doing here?
It’s forbidden! You have no right to go out entirely veiled. It’s
banned, it’s illegal. Go back to your country.” [I] feel like a
monster. Even pedophiles and criminals, are not treated like
that . . . . We are seen as less than nothing, not as human
beings.177
Once again, the experience of veil-wearers demonstrates the
counter-productive effect of the ban on veils.
Importantly, the legislative history also neglected to consider the
personal meanings that veil-wearers attribute to the veil. One woman
described the veil as “[m]y veil is my chastity, it is my behavior, it is my
politeness, it is my respect.”178 Another woman found herself empowered by
the veil: “A woman who is completely veiled, for me she is a woman with
strength, with enormous self-confidence. . . . You need it very much.”179
Several women rejected the claim that they only wear the veil because a man
has forced them to do so. “It’s really, really humiliating and degrading for
the personality of a Muslim girl, to hear someone say morning and evening
‘it’s the men who submit you, it’s the men who oblige you.’”180 Brems’s
interviews revealed that most veil-wearers only see the veil as a symbol—a
sign of religious devotion—and that the veil is unrelated to behavior or
gender relations.181 Indeed, the interviewees displayed varied and nuanced
stances on gender equality. One woman expressed that: “I do not want to be
equal to a man, I want to remain a woman, I don’t want to do the work of a
woman and a mother and do the work of a man on top of that.”182 Meanwhile,
a different woman offered a comparative experience:
I went to Egypt and met women with a burqa who were
lawyers, doctors. I also want to be like that, to achieve
175
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something more. I can study, I can work, I can do the same
things as any other woman or man. . . . At my house, we are
two to vacuum, two to prepare meals, two to bathe the
children, two to change the diapers, two to do the shopping,
two to babysit.183
Overall, many veil-wearers would prefer not to be forced to choose
between expressing their religious devotion or pursuing a career and life
outside of the household.184
Finally, there is an inherent illogic in the construction of the French ban,
along with similar bans. Notably, the exceptions to the ban are irrational
when the law is solely justified by the need to protect the rights of
socialization. These exceptions allow full-face coverings for sport, work,
and festivals.185 Yet if socialization is so important that a woman must be
forced to change her clothing whenever she goes out into public, there is no
reason why these exceptions should exist because they are also the bane of
social interaction.186 Furthermore, the rationale for the ban was similarly
untethered from logical justification. While a state may certainly impose
certain requirements on its populace given solid legal or moral
justification—e.g., prohibiting murder or requiring jury service––there is no
similar justification for arbitrarily inflicting the norms of a majority culture
on religious minorities.187 As the Council of State in the Netherlands rightly
noted, the only justification for this policy lies in “the subjective insecurity”
of the cultural majority.188
III. S.A.S. AND THE WIDE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION
While there is certainly a myriad of problems presented by the ECHR’s
decision in S.A.S., each of the aforementioned dilemmas stems from a
common cause: the wide margin of appreciation employed by the court.
Oftentimes, the critiques of S.A.S. fixate on how France’s actions go well
beyond the norm and clearly abrogate fundamental freedoms. Yet, these
actions are only possible because of a lack of international oversight. The
ECHR abdicated its duty to protect religious liberty and enabled France’s
bad actions. Indeed, this margin of appreciation standard is likely primarily
responsible for the spread of these bans, which will only further exacerbate
the problems noted in the critiques.
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Under the margin of appreciation, the ECHR has empowered France’s
secularist policy. Implicit in the decision in S.A.S. is the notion that French
society is so steeped with notions of secularism that this policy must be
allowed to continue. Put differently, the court has effectively declared that
secularism is a core French value. 189 Without critical evaluation, the court
has enshrined French secularism. Yet, this ignores ample evidence that
French secularism is actually biased by its historic Judeo-Christian roots.190
Given the continued affirmation of this policy by the court,191 it is highly
unlikely that it will ever engage in the critical evaluation necessary to realize
the faults of French secularism.
Likewise, the wide margin of appreciation has emboldened
assimilationist and nationalist movements that seek to create a single
national culture. When S.A.S. was decided, only two European nations had
enacted bans on the veil.192 Currently, however, eight nations employ some
variation of a veil ban, and more are likely to follow.193 Even in the United
Kingdom, which France has derided as too liberal in its acceptance of the
veil,194 a recent poll revealed that a majority of people support a burqa ban.195
Without international oversight, the hyper-fixation on eliminating the veil is
likely to continue. These nations have become obsessed with the perception
that the veil somehow impairs a person’s ability to integrate into the
society.196 It is also incredibly easy to justify these bans to the ECHR. Under
the wide margin of appreciation, nations are allowed to impose the social
norms of the majority culture upon any divergent minority group.
Furthermore, as evident in the court’s recent decisions in favor of Belgium’s
ban on the veil, the margin of appreciation allows these bans simply upon a
showing that the nation followed its normal legislative procedure.197 In
effect, should a nation descend into fascism and wish to annihilate a religious
minority, there is little that the court could do under this margin of
appreciation standard if the legislature approved of the transition to
fascism.198 Without oversight, there is little standing in the way of a
European nation treating its Muslim population the same way that the
Chinese treat the Uyghurs.
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Furthermore, when enacting these bans, there is little need to rely on any
empirical evidence—or even actual evidence—to support claims that the
veils inhibit social interaction. The ECHR’s margin of appreciation is so
broad that the court just accepts at face value the claim that the veil impairs
the wearer’s ability to communicate. The court decided this despite clear
evidence to the contrary.199 In fact, the margin of appreciation granted to
France’s principle of living together is more permissive than other standards
in this regard. When the court dismissed the claim that the veil impairs
gender equality, it reflected that there was no concrete support to this
claim.200 However, that same rigor was not applied to analyzing the dearth
of evidence in support of the “living together” argument. As a result, under
this lenient margin of appreciation standard, there is no protection against
capricious state action that is untethered from reality.
CONCLUSION
The margin of appreciation is a conflict inherent to the construction of
the Convention. It simultaneously declares a right to religious expression
and accords nations the ability to abrogate that freedom, albeit under certain
circumstances. In order for both to coexist, there must be a balance; the
interests of the states must be balanced against the religious interests of all
the citizens. S.A.S. disrupts the traditional balance of the margin of
appreciation. The ECHR enabled France to privilege the interests of some
of its citizens above the rights of veil-wearing women. Indeed, this
favoritism is already apparent in French secularism. While Judeo-Christian
traditions often remain acceptable under this policy, Islamic customs are
frequently targeted and rebuked; the policy itself even appears to stem from
bald Islamophobia. Likewise, the court’s margin of appreciation standard
found it equally palatable that France openly sought to root out minority
cultures in order to impose a unified national identity. Perhaps most
disturbing is the near-complete abandonment of judicial review of these
policies. The court has seemingly no interest in reviewing the factual basis,
or lack thereof, of veil bans. So long as these religious restrictions pass
through legislative bodies, the S.A.S. margin of appreciation requires no
further inquiry to find the law permissible. Through this standard, the court
has effectively ceded its authority in preventing religious discrimination.
The threat posed by anti-Muslim policies now gaining strength in
Europe is not mere conjecture. The current fate of the Uyghur population in
China reveals the danger lurking in Europe’s future should these policies
continue. Under policies resembling French secularism and the “living
together” argument, the Chinese government has enacted a cultural genocide
against the Uyghurs. If France can force Muslim women to remove their
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veils without repercussion, it is hardly a stretch of the imagination to
consider that France could also force Muslim men to shave, restrict access
to Mosques, or even prohibit celebration of Ramadan, as China has done.
Moreover, as China has experienced, these policies have encouraged acts of
terror and violence against civilians. Rather than unify the country, these
policies have created a deep schism between the Uyghurs and the rest of
China. For the same reasons, continuing towards this claimed goal of “living
together,” or forced assimilation, as it is better described, is likely to end in
the same result for France.
The threat posed by these policies is especially salient at this moment in
time given the rise in nationalism and fascism in Europe. In recent years,
parties such as the British National Party, the English Defense League,
Austria’s Freedom Party, and Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland have
gained strength in their respective countries. Many of these parties articulate
a desire for a single national culture, typically one that is white and Christian.
While these parties have not gained majority support per se, some of these
views have garnered majority support. A majority of the United Kingdom
supports a ban on the veil. Moreover, as demonstrated in this Note, France’s
veil ban, despite a troubling desire to mandate cultural norms, garnered
near-unanimous support in the French parliament. Should these nationalist
parties gain actual majority support, they could easily enact further
restrictions to enforce cultural norms and progress further towards the
current crisis of the Uyghurs in China.
Now, Europe is not destined to treat its Muslim population the same as
China. Unlike China, there is a dedicated system designed to prevent such
human rights abuses: the European Court of Human Rights. However, in
order to prevent this, the court actually needs to perform as intended and
conduct oversight of these policies. Without the court, there is nothing
stopping these nations and the growing nationalist movements therein from
following China’s example. The margin of appreciation applied in S.A.S. is
simply too broad to uphold the purposes of the Convention. If article 9 is to
have any value going forward, this standard must change.
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